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PANEL FOUR:
CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF
CORPORATE AND SECURITIES LAW
QUESTIONING PHILANTHROPY FROM A
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PERSPECTIVE
JILL E. Fiscif
I. INTRODUCTION

The panels in this program have described a variety of research
projects on the topic of corporate philanthropy, but until this conference,
corporate philanthropy had not received much attention from corporate
lawyers. There are a number of reasons for this. First, corporate
charitable donations and other philanthropic endeavors constitute a tiny
percentage of a corporation's overall operations.' In the aggregate,
corporate philanthropy rarely amounts to more than pennies per share. By
comparison, corporate tender offers, which have been the focus of
extensive legal and academic scrutiny, can involve premiums of as much
as fifty percent over market price. The relative insignificance of corporate
philanthropy, in dollar terms, means few investors are likely to complain
about the manner in which this money is spent.
Second, society is unlikely to be receptive to shareholder complaints
that charitable giving is inappropriate. In an age marked by the selfishness
of the "me generation" and scarred by the claims of Wall Street that
"greed is good," it seems churlish for shareholders to object to the social
responsiveness of a corporation that donates money to health, welfare, or
the environment. Charitable organizations, plagued by the shortage of
private donations, look to corporations as the last potential source of
funding. Moreover, corporate decision-makers, reasonably enough, view
philanthropy as a means to counter the popular image of the corporation
as a heartless and opportunistic Frankenstein's monster.2
* Professor of Law, Fordham Law School. Copyright 1996, Jill E. Fisch. I am
grateful to Steve Thel and my mother for their helpful comments on earlier drafts and for
the stimulating discussion by participants in the Symposium proceedings.
1. See David R. Morgan, Trends in CorporateCharitable Contributions,41 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 771, 786 (1997) (describing corporate giving patterns as ranging from one
to two percent of profits since the 1950s).
2. See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 567 (1933) (Brandeis, J.,

dissenting) (describing corporation as a "Frankenstein monster").
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Even if shareholders find corporate giving inappropriate, it is difficult

to object when philanthropic activity has become a norm of business
practice. Management scientists like Rikki Abzug explain that companies
imitate their peers with respect to giving patterns, a practice she terms
institutional isomorphism. If donating at a specified level is standard

operating procedure, how can shareholders complain about any particular
company's decision to follow that procedure?
Similarly, although regulators have taken the lead in initiating changes
in some corporate governance practices,' corporate philanthropy is unlikely
to generate objections from government authorities.
Increasingly,
government is looking for ways to downsize, and in particular, to replace
social services provided by government agencies with efforts by the private
sector.5 Corporate giving provides the funding for private sector charity
work that allows the government to reduce its role in financing social
programs and, in an era of scarce tax dollars, reduce the demand for
public funds.
Corporate philanthropy deserves more attention however than it has
traditionally received, because the questions of how and whether
corporations should donate are relevant to many modern themes in the
corporate governance debate. Corporate law has attempted to evaluate
appropriate business expenditures and the most effective way to run a
business, most visibly in connection with research and development
expenditures, 6 but also in areas such as political lobbying.' Charitable
3. See Rikki Abzug & Natalie J. Webb, Rationaland Extra-RationalMotivationsfor
Corporate Giving: Complementing Economic Theory with Organization Science, 41
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 1035, 1056-57 (1997).
4. See, e.g., Sec. Exchange Act Release No. 29796, 56 Fed. Reg. 51,953, 51,95354 (Oct. 16, 1991) (approving American Stock Exchange rule change requiring all listed
companies to have at least two independent directors and an audit committee comprised
of a majority of independent directors); N.Y. STOCK EXCH., N.Y. STOCK EXCH. LISTED
CO. MANUAL § 303.00 (1995) (requiring all domestic companies listed on the New York
Stock Exchange to have at least two outside directors and to have an audit committee
comprised of independent directors); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub.
L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312, 469-71 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(1993)) (adopting
a deductibility cap for executive compensation that is not performance based); Joel
Seligman, The Fifth Abraham L. Pomerantz Lecture: The New Corporate Law, 59
BROOK. L. REV. 1, 40-41 (1993) (describing history of amendments to the SEC
requirement that corporations disclose executive compensation).
5. See, e.g., Kim Nevin-Gattle, Predicting the Philanthropic Response of
Corporations:Lessons from History, Bus. HORIZONS, May-June 1996, at 15; When
Welfare CasesLand on State Playing Fields, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1996, at E12.
6. See, e.g., Steven S. Cherensky, Shareholders, Managers, and CorporateR&D
Spending: An Agency Cost Model, 10 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
299, 301 (1994); Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance
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giving raises similar questions. Is corporate philanthropy properly
characterized as serving a business purpose? If so, does it demonstrate
that corporations are not focused exclusively on short term profit
maximization? If philanthropy is not an ordinary business expense, should
philanthropic decisions be treated with the same deference accorded to
other business decisions?8
The propriety ofjudicial deference to corporate philanthropic decisions
also depends on the extent to which charitable giving creates a conflict of
interest in the corporation and encourages management self-dealing. As
Faith Kahn explains, charitable giving has been subject to less judicial
scrutiny than more traditional business expenditures. 9 Yet Jayne Barnard
cites egregious examples of management using corporate funds to further
their personal, political, and social objectives.'
More generally, corporate philanthropy can be used as a vehicle for
reconsideration of corporate purpose in general and the shareholder
primacy model in particular."
Potential shareholder objections to
corporate giving can be addressed by invoking stakeholder models of
corporate social responsibility, under which a corporation's decision to do
good need not be defended on the basis that the corporation will thereby
do well. 12 Charitable giving is a particularly useful model for examining
the social responsibility question because it requires a more detailed
analysis of the source of a corporation's imputed moral obligations.
Finally, corporate philanthropy stimulates an examination of the
corporation's political role in society. Social welfare spending-what
should be spent and who should spend it-is an explosive political issue.
The demarcation between government and private spending on public
welfare is at the forefront of current debate. Although corporations can
Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 8-9 (1987).
7. See generally Miriam Galston, Lobbying and the Public Interest: Rethinking the
Internal Revenue Code's Treatment of Legislative Activities, 71 TEX. L. REv. 1269
(1993) (describing current tax treatment of corporate lobbying activity as favorable).
8. Corporate law generally protects the decisions of management from judicial
scrutiny through application of the business judgment rule. See generally DENNIS J.
BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGEMENT RULE 6-7 (4th ed. 1993).

9. See Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora's Box: Managerial Discretion and the
Problem of Corporate Philanthropy, 44 UCLA L. REV. 579, 594-609 (1997) (describing
existing corporate law statutes that authorize charitable donations irrespective of corporate
benefit).

10. See Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Philanthropy, Executives' Pet Charities and
the Agency Problem, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 1147 (1997).
11.

See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 2-3

(1993) (defending the shareholder primacy model of corporate governance).
12. See infra notes 37-47 and accompanying text.
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be viewed as pawns in the effort to coopt additional private funds for the
public good, the result of funding social welfare expenditures through
corporate philanthropy is to shift the responsibility for deciding which
projects are worthy of funding into the hands of corporate decisionmakers. The effect of this shift is both to hide the decision-making
process from shareholders in particular and the public more generally, and
to create a system of social spending which is profoundly undemocratic.
II. THE RATIONALE FOR PHILANTHROPY FROM A
CORPORATE PERSPECTIVE

Corporate law's primary difficulty in formulating a methodology for
evaluating corporate philanthropy is in understanding why corporations
donate to charity. Nancy Knauer characterizes corporate philanthropy as
a paradox: if corporations exist to maximize profits, and donations reduce
profits, why do corporations donate money to charity? 3 From a law and
economics perspective, corporate charitable giving appears irrational. 4
Fund-raisers and their counterparts in corporate giving departments5
offer a traditional response: charitable giving benefits the corporation.'
As Hildy Simmons explained, corporations donate because of enlightened
self-interest. 6 There is no reason to be concerned about corporate
philanthropy because corporations do well by doing good. This argument
has held sway with the few courts that have considered the propriety of
corporate philanthropy. These courts upheld discretionary corporate
giving on the theory that donating to charity benefits the corporation.t7
It is possible to identify many examples of donations that benefit the
corporate donor. Corporate sponsors of the Olympics, for example, used
charitable giving as an alternative to other forms of advertising and
marketing and enhanced their reputations at the same time. To the extent
that charitable donations provide a direct corporate benefit, however, they
are not really philanthropic. Rather, donations that benefit the corporation
13. See Nancy I. Knauer, The Paradoxof Corporate Giving: Tax Expenditures, the
Nature of the Corporation,and the Social Construction of Charity, 44 DEPAUL L. REv.
1, 4 (1994).
14. See id. at 5.
15. See id. at 49-79.
16. See Hildy Simmons, Luncheon Address, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 1013, 1014
(1997).
17. For cases upholding corporate philanthropy against shareholder challenges see
Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 61 (Del. 1991); Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson,
257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del. Ch. 1969); A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 590
(N.J. 1953).
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should perhaps be recognized as an alternative form of business expense.' 8
This characterization renders the intellectual debate over the legitimacy of
corporate contributions relatively superficial; no one questions the
propriety of business expenditures that produce a corporate benefit.
Although some of the value derived from charitable giving may be
intangible or difficult to quantify, evaluating contributions that benefit the
corporation from a legal perspective is similar to evaluating any other
business expenditure.
This analysis fails to explain the distinctive legal treatment of
corporate philanthropy. If corporate donations are simply an alternative
form of business expense, they require no independent authority under
either corporate or tax law. Given that corporate business expenses are
deductible from gross income, there is little need to resort to the charitable
contribution analysis of § 17019 for the corporation to claim a tax
deduction. 20 Although there are some differences between the tax
treatment of corporate charitable contributions and that of business
expenses, in general the choice of classification will have no tax
consequences for the corporation.2
The explicit tax deduction for corporate charitable giving has been
explained on political grounds. Providing an explicit deduction for
corporate charitable contributions reflects a legislative endorsement of
corporate philanthropy.
Importantly, Congress initially issued this
endorsement at a time when the legal status of corporate philanthropy
under state law was unclear and when commerce clause concerns would
have impeded direct federal efforts to authorize corporate philanthropy as
a matter of substantive corporation law.22
From a corporation law perspective, the need for explicit statutory
authorization for charitable giving may have stemmed from the difficulty
early cases demonstrated in assessing the nature and amount of corporate
18. See Joseph Galaskiewicz, Corporate Contributions to Charity: Nothing More
than a Marketing Strategy, in PHILANTHROPIC GIVING: STUDIES IN VARIETIES AND
GoALS, 246, 247 (Richard Magat ed., 1989) (arguing that advertising and contributions
cannot be distinguished).
19. Section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code provides corporations with a deduction
for charitable contributions. For an analysis of the operation of § 170, see Linda Sugin,
Theoriesof the Corporationand the Tax Treatment of CorporatePhilanthropy, 41 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 835, 854-55 (1997).
20. Indeed, the charitable deduction may be inconsistent with § 170's requirement
of charitable intent. See id. at 854-55.
21. See Knauer, supra note 13, at 41-45.
22. See id. at 15-20 (describing the history behind the adoption of § 170 by

Congress).
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benefit generated by philanthropy. 3 It was unclear whether corporate
spending to generate goodwill or enhance the corporation's reputation
would be viewed as a legitimate exercise of corporate power. If a
corporation were specifically empowered to donate money to charity, it
would be unnecessary to establish the degree to which the corporation
benefitted from the donation. Thus the statutes may be viewed as
resolving legal uncertainty and difficult issues of proof.
The evolution of the business judgment rule has rendered this objective
obsolete, however. Corporate expenditures today are judged under the
business judgment rule, a standard that accords substantial deference to
management's judgment.2 4 The fact that a perceived benefit is intangible,
noneconomic, or uncertain will not invalidate a corporate expenditure.
Traditional corporate law standards create another problem, however,
when used to evaluate contributions as business expenditures. The judicial
deference accorded to such expenditures under the business judgment rule
may not be appropriate in the context of philanthropic expenditures.' The
business judgment rule is premised upon a presumption of management
disinterestedness. It is inapplicable in situations in which there is a
possible conflict of interest or self-dealing. 26 As Jayne Barnard explains,
although defenders of corporate philanthropy claim it benefits the business,
corporate giving is frequently motivated by the personal preferences of
corporate executives who use their power to choose, the recipients of large
corporate grants in order to support preferred causes or reap the social
perquisites afforded to large donors.
Corporate donations may also
assuage management's moral guilt, providing well-paid corporate
23. See Kahn, supra note 9, at 594-602 (describing historical treatment of
philanthropy by corporate law).
24. The business judgment rule creates "a presumption that in making a business
decision, not involving self-interest, the directors of a corporation acted on an informed
basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests
of the company." Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 207 (Del. 1991) (citations omitted).
25. See E.C. Lashbrooke, Jr., InternalRevenue Code Section 170 and the Great
Corporate Giveavay, 22 PAC. L.J. 221 (1991) (arguing that managers are the
beneficiaries of the corporation's charitable contributions and are thereby breaching their
duty of loyalty to the corporation by giving away corporate assets).
26. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (holding that for a

transaction to be protected by the business judgment rule "directors can neither appear
on both sides of a transaction nor expect to derive any personal financial benefit from it
in the sense of self-dealing").
27. See Barnard, supra note 10, at 1149; see also Kahn, supra note 9, at 1107

(describing ways in which philanthropy can serve managerial self-interest).
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executives with the opportunity to be philanthropists at shareholder
expense. 2

The possibility that corporate giving is motivated by management selfinterest rather than profit maximization is further supported by studies that
fail to find a conclusive link between charitable giving and profitability.2 9
Of course, there are many possible explanations for these results. It is
difficult to obtain firm-specific data, and further obstacles are presented by
the problem of classifying the data and determining what to include as
corporate philanthropy. 30 Does cause-related marketing count?3 1 How
should studies quantify gifts in kind or gifts of services? 32 Should the
public relations or advertising component of a donation be separated out?
It is also difficult to assess the direction in which causation runs.
Hildy Simmons describes the corporate decision about how much money
to donate as a function of expected profits, that is, corporations target their
giving level at a specified percentage of profits.33 If giving is a function
of expected profits, there will obviously be an identifiable relationship
between giving and profits, but the existence of that relationship does not
support any conclusion about causality.34
28. This perspective can be seen in Henry Ford's defense of his decision to reduce
prices on automobiles on the altruistic basis that the Ford Motor Co. had "made too much
money" and should share its profits with the public. See Dodge v. Ford, 170 N.W. 668,
684 (Mich. 1919).
29. See, e.g., James R. Boatsman & Sanjay Gupta, Taxes and Corporate Charity:
Empirical Evidencefrom Micro-Level PanelData, 49 NAT'L TAX J. 193 (1996) (finding
data supporting the characterization of philanthropy as maximizing managers' utility rather
than maximizing profits). But cf. Peter Navarro, Why Do CorporationsGive to Charity?,
61 J. Bus. 65, 65-66, 90 (1988) (citing previous empirical studies that have failed to
explain the relationship between philanthropy and profitability but concluding, based on
new data, that "profit maximization is an important motive driving contributions").
30. See Michelle Sinclair & Joseph Galaskiewicz, Corporate-NonprofitPartnerships:
Varieties and Covariates, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1059, 1065-76 (1997) (describing
reasons why it is difficult to measure the extent to which philanthropy benefits individual
firms); see also Navarro, supra note 29, at 65 (citing the absence of firm-specific data).
31. See Knauer, supranote 13, at 64 (describing cause-related marketing).
32. See, e.g., Karen Benezra, Companies Take New Approaches to Charitable
Giving, GANNETT NEWs SERVICE, Oct. 25, 1993 (describing the Corporate Angel
Network, which matches cancer patients with empty seats on corporate jets, as a
philanthropic program that saves the patients plane fare but does not cost the corporation
anything).
33. See Simmons, supra note 16.
34. See Navarro, supra note 29, at 78 (recognizing that the correlation between
giving and profitability is also consistent with a "'rule of thumb' method of determining
contribution levels"). Studies such as that conducted by Sinclair and Galaskiewicz cast
further doubt on the causal link by observing that substantial variance in corporate giving
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Philanthropy is problematic for corporate law if economic studies
cannot establish that philanthropic decisions are profit maximizing. The
problem arises, in part, because the law recognizes that the markets in
which a corporation operates constrain management discretion within
permissible limits. The discipline of the market provides a substitute for
extensive regulatory oversight. Market checks also reduce the agency
costs of corporate decision-making without the need for extensive
shareholder involvement; the market operates as a monitor.35 The market
operates as a poor monitor for management decisions that are not tied to
profit maximization, however, and traditional deference to management
creates the possibility of self-dealing.36 If the extensive enterprise of
corporate philanthropy is spurred by the fact that management rather than
the company benefits, then corporate law should respond by regulating
corporate giving.
Defenders of corporate philanthropy in terms of corporate social
responsibility offer an alternative explanation. They suggest that corporate
giving is not motivated by either management self-dealing or the quest for
profit. Instead, corporate philanthropy has been described in terms of
moral obligation. If corporations are viewed as moral actors with an
obligation to serve society as well as shareholders, charitable donations
may be viewed as part of that obligation.37 This conception of corporate
objectives is consistent with the stakeholder model of corporate
governance, in which the obligations of a corporation run to a variety of
nonshareholder constituencies including employees, customers, and
members of the community. 3 8 Early supporters of broad fiduciary
obligations for corporate management, the forerunners of the stakeholder
patterns exist among firms with similar levels of profitability. See Sinclair &
Galaskiewicz, supra note 30.
35. See generally Ralph Winter, State Law, ShareholderProtection and the Theory
of the Corporation,6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977) (describing the manner in which market
checks offer a substitute for regulation as a means of monitoring corporate decisionmaking).
36. See Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Discretion of CorporateManagement to Do Good
at the Expense of Shareholder Gain-A Survey of, and Commentary on, the U.S.
CorporateLav, 13 CANADA-U.S. L.J. 7, 29-32 (1988) (questioning the degree to which
market discipline operates as an adequate check on management discretion in the context
of corporate philanthropy).
37. See generally Lawrence E. Mitchell, Cooperationand Constraintin the Modem
Corporation:An Inquiry into the Causes of CorporateImmorality, 73 TEX. L. REV. 477
(1995) (describing a conception of the corporation as moral actor).
38. See, e.g., John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate Cooperation,
RelationshipManagement, and the TrialogicalImperativefor CorporateLaw, 78 MINN.
L. REV. 1443, 1466-68 (1994).
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movement, defended their positions similarly in terms of a corporation's
moral or social responsibility.39
The source of a corporation's moral obligations is unclear, however.
Even if natural persons have obligations to "give something back to
society," stemming from the nature of the human condition, the social
contract, or religious principles-a question beyond the scope of this
essay'°-the existence of individual obligations does not resolve the
question for the corporation. Corporations are not individuals, nor do
they, by virtue of the corporate form, inherit all the rights and
responsibilities of natural persons.4 It is unnecessary to assume that the
aggregation of investment funds and use of the corporate form for the
purpose of pursuing a business objective necessarily carry social
responsibilities apart from the obligations of the individual participants.
Advocates of the stakeholder model of corporate governance disagree.
Extrapolating from the arguments for corporate social responsibility
articulated in the famous Dodd-Berle debate, 42 they claim that a
corporation is legally and morally obliged to consider the interests of the
society in which it operates and to conduct its operations with a view
toward serving those interests. 43 This position is supported by the
proliferation of "other constituency" statutes which allow and in some
cases require directors to broaden their objectives in corporate decisionmaking beyond profit maximization toward a consideration of the interests
of nonshareholder constituencies.'
39. See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are CorporateManagers Trustees?, 45

HARV. L. REv. 1145 (1932).
40. For analysis of individual giving patterns based on prestige and "warm glow"

see William T. Harbaugh, What Do Donations Buy? (working paper on file with the
author).
41. See Jill E. Fisch, Frankenstein'sMonsterHits the Campaign Trail:An Approach
to Regulation of Corporate PoliticalExpenditures, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 587, 630

n. 227 (1991) (describing the academic debate over the appropriate characterization of a
corporation, including the "personhood" theory). But cf. Gregory Mark, The

Personificationof the Business Corporationin American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1441
(1987) (discussing conception of corporation as a person);

42. See Dodd, supranote 39; Adolph A. Berle, Jr., For Whom CorporateManagers

Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932); see also Davis, supra note 36,
at 17-19 (describing the debate).
43. See Davis, supranote 36; see also Mark E. Van Der Weide, Against Fiduciary
Duties to Corporate Stakeholders, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27 (1996) (describing the
development of the stakeholder model).
44. See Committee on Corporate Laws, ABA, Other Constituencies Statutes:

PotentialFor Confusion, 45 Bus. LAW. 2253, 2261-63 (1990); see generally Lawrence
E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate
Constituency Statutes, 70 TEx. L. REv. 579 (1992) (defending the use of other
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Even in states which have legislatively endorsed the stakeholder model
of corporate governance, the characterization of philanthropy as a
corporate obligation is inconsistent with existing practice. If philanthropy
is based on a corporation's moral or social obligation-perhaps justified by
the grant to corporations of special powers and legal rights, such as limited
liability-why is it optional? Corporations vary tremendously in their
giving patterns,4" from IBM, which donated $118.3 million to charity in
1992 alone, 46 to Sunbeam, whose CEO Albert Dunlap has publicly stated
his opposition to corporate giving and who, in his previous position,
eliminated the charitable foundation at Scott Paper.47 Why do regulators
make no effort to monitor the degree to which corporations adhere to their
obligation to society and to enforce noncompliance with societal norms?
The laxity of the current regime allows complete free-riding by some
corporations on the philanthropic efforts of others, free-riding that may
well put socially responsible corporations at a competitive disadvantage in
the marketplace if charity does not produce a benefit to the corporation.
There are also problems with entrusting corporate moral obligations
to the discretion of corporate management. In addition to the agency costs
created by this delegation, it is not clear that shareholders would willingly
grant management discretion to choose how much to give and which
philanthropic causes to serve. The exercise of this discretion, removed
from the oversight of disclosure to or approval by shareholders, need have
no connection to shareholder values or widely-held social priorities.4"
Evidence on charitable giving provides some reason to doubt that
corporate donations reflect the charitable objectives of individual
shareholders. Studies show that most individual giving goes to religious
organizations. 49 Similarly, when Berkshire Hathaway, the one publiclytraded company to allow shareholders to designate charitable recipients,
constituency statutes).
45. See Sinclair & Galaskiewicz, supra note 30, at 1076-79.
46. See Benezra, supra note 32, at 4.
47. See David Altaner, Dunlap: No Charity Here, SUN-SENTINEL, Aug. 25, 1996
at IF (describing Dunlap as advocating an end to corporate support of charities).
48. Corporate giving to elite institutions, such as funding for the arts, suggests

corporate decision-making may not reflect general societal needs. As Linda Sugin has
observed, corporations may also be more conservative than individual shareholders in
their giving patterns, leading to a decrease in the range of philanthropic causes that are
served. See Sugin, supra note 19, at 851.
49. Comment, Must God RegulateReligious Corporations?A ProposalFor Reform

of the Religious CorporationProvisionsof the Revised Model Nonprofit CorporationA ct,
42 EMORY L.J. 721, 721-22 (1993) (stating that religious organizations are the largest
overall recipients of charitable contributions).
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instituted "The Berkshire Program,"5" it found that a large number of gifts
were made to charities with a religious affiliation."1 The contribution
policies of most publicly-held corporations, however, explicitly prohibit
donations that are to be used for religious purposes.5 2
Moreover, to the extent that corporate social responsibility is defended
by attacking the private property model of the corporation and defining the
corporation as something of a public resource, voluntary charitable giving
seems a poor substitute for the traditional method of collecting and
distributing funding for the public interest-the tax system. If society
views charities as serving general social needs, the process of funding
these needs through tax revenues and allocating the revenues through the
legislative process allows majoritarian decision-making about the
appropriate spending priorities. Corporate contributions substitute the
decisions of management for those of the voting public and its elected
representatives.
The defense of charitable giving in terms of the public interest, raises
a troubling dimension to corporate philanthropy: the political nature of
some charitable spending. Many prominently philanthropic corporations
are those involved in heavily regulated industries. Philip Morris and
Exxon exemplify the efforts of companies subject to extensive regulation
to display their public-spiritedness through charitable giving. 3 Donations
of this type, which attempt to buy not merely public but also legislative
goodwill, may be analogized to lobbying. Indeed, corporations may direct
their giving to the causes favored by those politicians viewed as likely to
impose greater regulatory restrictions, in an effort to deter intrusive
regulation. This rationale might explain why Exxon is a prominent donor
50. Berkshire Hathaway instituted the Berkshire Program in 1981. For a description
of the program see Warren Buffett's Letter to Shareholders, The Berkshire Hathaway
Annual Report (1981), reprinted in The Essays of Warren Buffett, 19 CARDOZO L. REV.
(forthcoming 1997) [hereinafter Essays].

51. See Warren Buffett's Letter to Shareholders, The Berkshire Hathaway Annual
Report (1993), reprinted in id.
52. See, e.g., EXXON CORP. APPLICATION INFORMATION SHEET (on file with the
New York Law School Law Review) (stating that Exxon does "not provide funds to be
used for religious or political purposes"); MOBIL FOUNDATION, INC., GRANT GUIDELINES
3 [hereinafter MOBIL GRANT GUIDELINES] (stating that grants are not made to "religious

organizations for religious purposes"). Corporate giving is subject to other restrictions.
For example, Mobil also chooses not to support organizations "concerned with specific
diseases" and "veterans and military organizations." See MOBIL GRANT GUIDELINES,

supra at 3.
53. In 1995, for example, Exxon made contributions totalling $55 million directly
and through the Exxon Foundation.
CONTRIBUTIONS

IN

THE

DIMENSIONS 95, A REPORT ON EXXON'S 1995

PUBLIC INTEREST

FOUNDATIONREPORT 3 (1996).

INCLUDING

THE EXXON

EDUCATION
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to environmental causes.5 4 Unlike direct political expenditures, charitable
giving rarely incurs the negative public opinion response associated with
lobbying. Moreover, in an era in which political contributions are subject
to increasing scrutiny, we should not overlook the potential of charitable
spending to influence the political process. 5
To the extent that corporate philanthropy has a political dimension, it
may also create internal corporate conflict. Controversy about AT&T's
donations to Planned Parenthood 56 and Domino Pizza's support for the
Right to Life movement 7 demonstrates the potential political problems
associated with corporate philanthropy. 8 Neither tax regulations nor
corporate governance guidelines designate appropriate beneficiaries of
corporate largess, relying instead upon the tax exempt status of charitable
recipients as a proxy for their suitability. However, charitable donations
that allow corporations to take political positions inconsistent with those
of their shareholders pose similar First Amendment questions to those that
have been raised in the debate over regulation of corporate political
speech. s9
54. See id. at 8-10 (listing Exxon's contributions to environmental causes in 1995).
See also Craig Smith, The New CorporatePhilanthropy, HARv. Bus. REv., May 1994,
at 105 (describing concern that Arco might develop too close a relationship with the
environmental groups to which it contributes).
55. See, e.g., Barry D. Karl, The Evolution of Corporate GrantmatingIn America,
in THE CORPORATE CONTRIBUTIONs HANDBOOK 20 (James P. Shannon ed., 1991)

(stating that corporate giving has allowed corporations to influence "public policy directly
through the power to decide how their contributions to public well-being would be spent
rather than leaving such decisions to political negotiations").
56. See Gregory E. David, Of Grants and Grief: Trying to Do Good can Sometimes
Keep a Company from Doing Well, FIN. WORLD, Aug. 3, 1993, at 64 (describing
controversy generated by AT&T's donations to Planned Parenthood and subsequent
decision to end that support in response to pressure from pro-life organizations as "the
mother of all philanthropic controversies").
57. The donations to the Right to Life movement are actually made by Domino's
Pizza founder and CEO Thomas Monaghan. See Just Say No: Boycotts at the Barricades,
NEWSWEEK, Aug. 14, 1989, at 21 (describing boycotts of Domino's Pizza by the National
Organization for Women).
58. See Smith, supranote 54, at 105, 111 (describing Planned Parenthood's response
to AT&T's decision to deny funding as a "costly embarrassment for AT&T").
59. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792-95 (1978) (rejecting
protection of First Amendment rights of dissenting shareholders as justification for statute
restricting corporate political speech); see also Fisch, supra note 41 at 635-42 (1991)
(examining the degree to which existing corporate law doctrines can and should address
shareholder concerns about corporate political speech); see generally Alan J. Meese,
Limitations on Corporate Speech: Protection for Shareholders or Abridgment of
Expression?, 2 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 305 (1993) (examining shareholder
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The political dimension of corporate giving is particularly relevant to
Faith Kahn's proposal that the SEC mandate more extensive disclosure of
charitable giving by corporations.6 0
Although many corporations
voluntarily disclose their charitable donations in separate philanthropy
literature such as charitable giving pamphlets, as Faith observes, there is
virtually no disclosure about charitable donations in investor-related
information such as annual reports.6 1 If corporations donate because
giving creates goodwill and favorable publicity beneficial to the
corporation or out of a sense of moral obligation or altruism, we would
expect to see extensive publicity associated with corporate philanthropy
even in the absence of SEC-mandated disclosure. Greater publicity for
corporate giving would appear to further the objectives behind the
donations. Moreover, even if corporations did not direct disclosure of
their philanthropy to the investment markets, if a corporation's
philanthropic practices were relevant to its profitability, we would expect
to see securities analysts research and distribute the information as material
to investors.
The failure of corporate giving practices to draw investor attention
may result from the relatively limited disclosure provided by
corporations.62 The political aspect of philanthropy suggests a reason for
corporations to limit disclosure. If corporations donate to politically
controversial sources or the gifts are made in an attempt to obtain political
influence, disclosure may generate negative publicity and be adverse to the
interests of the corporation. 63
III. CONCLUSION
Understanding why corporations donate to charity is an important first
step in evaluating corporate philanthropy and formulating an appropriate
response from the perspective of corporate governance. Faith Kahn has
furthered this endeavor substantially with her organization of this
symposium. As the preceding analysis indicates, the manner in which
corporate law should regulate corporate philanthropy requires further
exploration of a number of issues, many of which benefit from the
interdisciplinary work demonstrated in this conference. The research
protection justification for regulating corporate speech).
60. See Kahn, supra note 9, at 623.
61. See id.
62. See JAMES T. BENNETT, PATTERNS OF CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY 10 (1989)

(describing corporate managers as "secretive" about corporate philanthropy).
63. See David, supra note 56, at 64-65 (describing "political firestorms" that may

result from corporate contributions to controversial recipients).
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efforts taking place in business schools, non-profit organizations, and
government agencies, are creating a more integrated picture of the role of
philanthropy in for-profit business.
This conference, and this essay, offer suggestions about where to start
in creating a framework within which to understand corporate
philanthropy. Ultimately, whether the law should allow or encourage
corporate giving requires corporate lawyers to address three distinct
questions.
First, is corporate giving good for business? Even under a narrow
characterization of business objectives as profit maximization, existing
studies have been unable to determine the relationship, if any, between
corporate philanthropy and profitability. Further research in this area, to
the extent it can overcome the technical difficulties noted above, is sorely
needed. Empirical evidence may allow us to weigh the claim that
philanthropy is good for business against the alternative characterization
of corporate giving as management self-dealing.
Second, is giving good for shareholders? Although the status of the
shareholder primacy model in corporate law is unclear, shareholder
interests remain a principal reason for the adoption of regulatory
standards. Even if corporate philanthropy has no discernable effect on the
bottom line, corporate giving may further shareholders' interests under a
social responsibility, altruism, or common objective model of the
corporation.
Here too, further research avenues exist.
Would
shareholders voluntarily vote to authorize corporate philanthropy? What
efforts have shareholders made to prevent corporate giving?
Do
shareholders view corporate giving as a substitute for their own giving
and, if so, does corporate giving provide a satisfactory substitute?
This analysis extends beyond the question of whether corporations
should donate and suggests issues about the manner in which corporations
set their donation policy. Although Berkshire Hathaway has innovated a
procedure for shareholders to designate the recipients of corporate
philanthropy, there is no evidence that this portends a general trend for
corporations to provide shareholders with greater control over giving
policies or the choice of charitable beneficiaries. Particularly, if corporate
philanthropy is justified as derivative of shareholders' moral obligations,
it is unclear that the existing managerial structure of the firm offers an
appropriate vehicle for shareholders to delegate the satisfaction of these
obligations.
Indeed, the broad discretion traditionally afforded to
management may pose a risk to shareholders' interests analogous to that
presented by management's control over corporate political activity.
Third, is corporate giving good for society? The justifications for
corporate philanthropy based on principles of social responsibility rest
upon the view that, whether or not corporate giving causes a corporation
to do well, giving money to charity constitutes doing good. This
perspective is reflected in the existing treatment of corporate philanthropy
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under both tax and corporate law. The substantive conclusion that
corporate giving is good for society is premised on two distinct
components: 1) charitable giving is generally good, and 2) some charitable
giving should take place at the corporate, as opposed to the individual,
level.
Analysis of the first point is beyond the scope of this essay.
Accepting the premise that charitable giving is good however, does not
automatically lead to the conclusion that charitable giving by corporations
is desirable. It is possible to hypothesize that corporate contributions raise
overall societal giving levels, that corporations are able to donate more
efficiently, or corporate decision-makers are better able to determine
societal needs than individuals. Addressing these hypotheses suggests a
need for corporate law to recognize the quasi-public role created for
management in allocating funds generated by private property and
enhanced through the tax subsidy, to social programs.
It is difficult to see why corporate executives are particularly qualified
to prioritize social expenditures. The attributes that qualify an individual
to manage a corporation are not obviously linked to the ability to identify
social needs and structure spending decisions to address those needs. Nor
is it likely that corporate shareholders, in choosing boards of directors,
believe they are selecting for these qualities. Most importantly, the
selection of corporate decision-makers is a private decision made
exclusively by the corporation's shareholders. Corporate managers, unlike
political officials, are not accountable to the general public. Delegating
discretion over the funding of social programs to the private sector creates
a risk that the results will differ from the priorities set through the
democratic process.

